The City-State of the Soul by Crotty Kevin;

Author:Crotty, Kevin;
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: undefined
Publisher: Lexington Books
Published: 2012-08-15T00:00:00+00:00

The Law Requiring Philosophers to Rule

Nonetheless, the philosopher needs to be compelled by law to take up the burdens of governance—a point Socrates stresses.[30] As we have seen, there is a genuine problem here that needs to be cleared up. But I think that the scholarly discussion has been misleading in the way that it uncritically assumes a particular view of law—viz., law as a body of coercive commands. If you understand law this way, then, naturally, it looks like an abridgment of human freedom. In our particular case, the law requiring philosophers to rule seems to compromise their happiness. A law, understood as a coercive command, may be just and, therefore, entitled to obedience. But this way of thinking about law leaves justice looking like an irksome obligation. But that, of course, is what Socrates is trying to show that justice is not.

In fact, Socrates has shown a better way to think about law, as a tool to shape community. Law is not primarily or even necessarily a constraint on greedy impulses, even if it must function that way in imperfect societies. Nor is it, as Thrasymachus had urged, a way for rulers to entrench themselves in power and exploit their subjects. Rather, it, too, is a creative tool—a potent force in bringing about the kind of people that the city requires if it is to flourish.[31] It enables people to achieve what they want—a mutually advantageous life together in a stable and peaceful community[32]—but which their native qualities might make difficult to achieve. The laws are like parents: they spawn the citizens. The source of their authority is the same as the source of parents’ authority: to them, we owe our characters (see Crito 50d–e; cf. Rep. 7.520b1–c1; 537e1–539a7). Law, in short, does the work of eros, by binding the various parts of the city together into one (7.519e1–520a4).

If we understand law this way—as a way of shaping communities—then how does the law obligating philosophers to rule look? We notice, preliminarily, that the very need to coerce—to compel philosophers to rule—is part of what makes them good rulers (Rep. 7.520d2–5). Philosophers must be lovers of the city, but not at all “lovers of ruling” (ἐραστὰς τοῦ ἄρχειν, 521b4). Paradoxically, the philosopher’s reluctance to rule is part of her qualifications for holding sovereign power in the city. The philosopher who has relished contemplating the Forms of Justice, Courage, Wisdom and Sophrosune will find the stresses of political office arduous and distracting. But that is a good thing: as Socrates observes, “If you can find something better than ruling for those who will rule, then you have the possibility of a well governed city” (Rep. 7.520e4–521a2).

Next, without a law compelling philosophers to rule, it might seem that philosophers are impermissibly meddling in others’ affairs, in violation of the basic principle of justice, which prohibits meddlesomeness (or polupragmosune). After all, Socrates anticipates that the idea of a philosopher-ruler will shock people. Rule by philosophers does not seem like a “natural” idea, nor is its wisdom immediately obvious.

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